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In both books under review Brian Manning presents again, unrevised and unrepent- 
ant, his thesis that the English revolution was in essence a class struggle led by the 
"middle sort" against the governing class of landowners, merchants, lawyers and 
higher clergy. The English People and the English Revolution is virtually identical to 
the first edition published in 1976, except that it now contains a wide-ranging, 
forty-seven-page introduction summarizing the work of other historians as it im- 
pinges upon Manning's thesis. The only significant change in the body of the text 
occurs in his passage on the function of puritanism in galvanizing the middle sort to 
overthrow the existing order. Originally it read " ... puritanism taught the middle sort 
of people to think for themselves and to assert their independence against King, lords 
and bishops. Godliness gave them status and the ability to express their identity as a 
separate class; and it enabled them to formulate and dignify their hostility towards 
the ruling class." In the second edition this passage is modified to read, ". .. puritanism 
taught some of the middle sort ... " ( 241, emphasis added) 
Who were the "middle sort" on whom this revolution hinged? The author tells us 
that they included the landowning peasantry, copyholders beleaguered by high rents, 
insecurity of tenure, enclosure, population growth, bad harvests and industrial de- 
pression. The second major group who made up the middle sort were craftsmen, 
clothworkers particularly, who were devastated by the crises and slumps that were 
endemic in their industry after 1614. Peasants and craftsmen shared a capacity for 
independent opinion and action which was rooted in their own economic inde- 
pendence. Other issues which united them were unjust taxation, tithes, and the 
limitations on the franchise. 
It was bread-and-butter issues, led by the great depression in the cloth trade, that 
brought the lower classes into the revolution, Manning maintains. Once they became 
involved, "the nature of the crisis changed: economic questions advanced from the 
rear to the front of the stage, and the mere fact of the involvement of the people 
changed political conflicts and religious antagonisms into social conflicts and class 
antagonisrns." (168) Yet earlier in the book Manning states that, in contrast to the 
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nobility and gentry who focused on constitutional issues, it was "religious issues that 
stirred the mob" in London. (8) They feared popery, and hated the bishops and the 
prayer book. They were the ones behind the Root and Branch Petition for the radical 
restructuring of the church. 
To reinforce his class interpretation of the revolution Manning points to the fact 
that in 1642-3 the people were more hostile towards cavalier soldiers than roundhead 
ones. He draws our attention to the activity of the middle sort on Parliament's behalf 
in Essex and Suffolk, as well as the clothing districts of Yorkshire and the West 
country, the lead-mining districts of the Somerset Mendips and the metal-working 
area of the West midlands. In Manchester and the West Riding of Yorkshire the lower 
classes pushed the gentry and stiffened their will to resist the king. 
In his introduction to the second edition Manning sums up his interpretation as 
follows: "class conflict was always present but latent before 1640; it came close to 
the surface in 1641-2 and propelled parliament to challenge the King and the King 
to resist parliament; it drove parliament to victory, and became explicit in the 
aftermath of economic hardship and disillusionment with the result of victory: 
between 1646 and 1649 the revolution became an open class conflict with the 
emergence of the Levellers ..." (40) 
Manning's interpretation is in some respects persuasive, and indeed it has won 
qualified support from historians as various as Tim Harris, Barry Reay, David 
Underdown, Derek Hirst, William Hunt, Keith Lindley, Clive Holmes, Ann Hughes 
and Gordon Blackwood. By contrast, John Morrill, Frances Dow, Anthony Fletcher 
and Buchanan Sharp have more or less rejected it out of hand. Derek Hirst has 
commented, "there does seem some correlation between industrial organization and 
popular alignment," whereas Buchanan Sharp denies that there was widespread 
popular support for parliament, commenting that "there is little solid evidence that 
the widespread outbreaks of popular disorder in 1641 and 1642 were in any sense 
motivated by pro-parliament sympathies or viewed with anything but suspicion by 
prominent parliamentarians." (24) 
There are other problems with Manning's class interpretation. On one page he says 
that it was religion which drove on the London mob. A few pages later he states that 
it was bread and butter issues that brought the lower classes into the Civil War and 
transformed it into aclass conflict. The notion that the lower classes pushed the gentry 
in Yorkshire to resist the king does not find support in a recent study of the northern 
parliamentary army. According to Jennifer Jones the officers of this army - both 
gentry and middle sort -far from being dragged reluctantly into the war, joined up 
voluntarily at great personal expense. Moreover, they dug deep into their own pockets 
to equip and arm their men, ran up huge arrears of pay, and also lent their men money 
when pay failed to arrive from the Treasury at Westminster.' Although Manning 
acknowledges the reality of popular royalism, in that many freeholders, copyholders 
1 Jemifer Jones, "The War in the North: The Northern Parliamentarian Army in the English Civil War, 
1642-1645," Ph.D. thesis, York University [Toronto], 1991, 243, 248-50. 
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and substantial farmers supported the king, he continues to deny that this support was 
freely given. Tenants were pressured by their landlords into joining the king's army. 
What is more, "fear and force lay in the background if loyalty and deference 
failed." (325) It is a pity that Manning has left this sentence unmodified when in the 
introduction he acknowledges that Underdown's researches "confirm the existence 
of a widespread popular royalism ... which cannot be dismissed as the mere product 
of deferential obedience to the tlite." (29) Certainly in my own work on London I 
have found that by the summer of 1647, if not before, large numbers of lower class 
people - apprentices, butchers, porters, sailors and watermen in particular - were 
vehement in their hostility to the Independent Party and in their support for peace 
with the king.' 
Likewise, it seems to me that Manning misinterprets the clubmen phenomenon 
when he classifies them as "lower class men showing the way to win the war, and as 
portents of a popular triumph over the royalists." (31 1) The clubmen were a chame- 
leon-like group whose agenda differed from county to county. The glue which bound 
them together was localism, and a hatred of the Civil War. In every part of the country 
their overriding objective was to keep the war out of their own county. In some 
counties the best way to realize this objective might be to back the Parliamentary 
forces. But in other counties they backed the royalists. Cromwell and Fairfax, who 
physically crushed an armed assembly of Dorset, Wiltshire and Somerset clubmen in 
the summer of 1645, would have been surprised to learn that these men were "portents 
of a popular triumph over the royalists." (3 11) 
1649: The Crisis of the English Revolution is a more synthetic but less coherent 
book than The English People. It rehearses many of the same themes found in the 
first book, but resembles more a series of discrete essays than a connected account 
of this crucial year in the history of the revolution. One of the book's chief virtues is 
that it engages, in a spirited but fair-minded fashion, with most of the recent scholarly 
work on the English revolution, by writers such as Christopher Hill, David Under- 
down, Gerald Aylmer, John Morrill, Perez Zagorin, Ronald Hutton, and the present 
writer. In response to his critics Manning has somewhat modified his earlier analysis. 
Accepting Underdown's point that the revolutionary agenda was forced through by 
a minority of religious radicals, he none the less makes the telling point that the King 
was hardly an object of great popular veneration. During the year or more that he was 
in captivity not one of his subjects risked his life to save him. 
In this apocalyptic year the air was thick with prophecies of the second coming of 
Jesus Christ. This expectant millenarianism, observes Manning, "gave people 
strength and courage to do extraordinary and revolutionary things, and the capacity 
to visualise a new form of government and a different sort of society, in the conviction 
that they were pursuing God's purpose; but that same expectation meant that whatever 
they put in place of what they destroyed had only a provisional and transitory 
2 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Irelandund Scurlmd,1645-1653 (Oxford 1992). 187, 
256. 
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character, until Christ inaugurated his kingdom on earth. If that did not happen soon 
the dreams of real and permanent change would quickly fade." (47) 
The second chapter is an excursion into the recent scholarship on status and class 
in early-modem England. Manning is compelled to confront the fact that historians 
as diverse as Lawrence Stone, Peter Laslett, Keith Wrightson and David Cressy deny 
the existence of social class in this period. Lawrence Stone's statement is as good as 
any: English society was "a single hierarchy of status defined by titular rank, and to 
a certain extent by legal and fiscal privilege." (quoted on 49) Manning is adept at 
pointing out the inconsistencies between the accounts of these other scholars, but he 
is less successful at convincing us to adopt his model of a self-conscious "middle 
sort" who piloted the revolution. His assertion that " ... the shift of power was from a 
class - the governing class of peers and greater or county gentry. It was a shift of 
power towards the area of status uncertainty where minor gentry, yeomen, business 
and professional men merged" is more nuanced than what we find in the first book, 
but inevitably it blurs the limpid clarity of his earlier thesis. (68-9) Thus it is strange 
to read that "the social context of the revolution was an evolving middle class and 
working class." (78) 
The greatest inconsistency however occurs in the third chapter, on "The revolution 
and the poor." He opens the chapter with a quotation from J.H. Elliott that "There 
was one permanent and universal precondition for revolt in every society in early 
modern Europe: the pressure of population on food resources, and the ever-present 
threat of harvest failure and starvation. Because of this threat, the possibility of 
popular uprisings was built into every society, and only a sudden tax increase or a 
rise in the price of bread was needed to precipitate a tumult." (79) This precondition 
was without question present in England between 1646 and 1649. The conjuncture 
of harvest failures and trade depression in those years made it, in JP Cooper's words, 
" ... probably the worst economic crisis of the century." (79) Yet after describing the 
impact of this economic crisis in the most heart-rending terms, Manning is compelled 
to admit that "the most remarkable fact is the absence of popular disorders." (95) 
This does not prevent him from reiterating that "the basic conflict in society was 
between rich and poor." (103) Yet the great heroes of Manning's book, the Diggers, 
always maintained that their ideal of agrarian communism must be brought to pass 
by voluntary action, not violence. Manning makes the novel point however, that the 
Diggers did favour the withdrawal of labour from the estates of landlords, and the 
stoppage of rent payments by tenants. If not violent, these strategies would certainly 
have been coercive. 
Gerrard Winstanley, the leader of the Diggers, is an enormously attractive figure, 
even if he did revert to a life of respectability after the Restoration, as J.D. Alsop has 
shown.3 But their story has been well told before, by Christopher Hill in particular, 
and one wonders why it should be necessary to devote so many pages to a tiny 
movement which attracted no support from the army or the Levellers. Nor is one 
3 "Gerrard Winstanley's later life," P a ~ t  & Present, 82 (1979), 73-81. 
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entirely satisfied with Manning's explanation for the absence of any rising of the poor 
during the revolutionary period. It is all very well to write that "the poor were 
contained within a structure of dependency and domination." (133) So were the 
continental poor, but that did not prevent them from rising up against their oppressors 
several times during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
The fourth chapter, like the second, is a wide-ranging consideration of a question 
that has animated social historians over the past two decades: gender and patriarchal- 
ism. Disappointing to most feminists must be the fact that even at the height of the 
revolution England remained patriarchal and gerontocratic. Great advances were 
made in the realms of religious toleration, lay preaching, and the spiritual equality of 
men and women, but no one, not even female radicals, questioned the assumption 
that the husband should be the head of the household. The number of women who 
joined the radical sects was small, and as Manning himself points out, the first 
politically active women were anti-revolutionary. The peace movement of 1642 and 
1643, which produced several petitions and demonstrations in Westminster against 
the civil war, was led by women. Parliament dispersed them by armed force. Despite 
the moderation of their message, these women were radical "in asserting a feminine 
political consciousness and a feminine voice and a feminine presence in the masculine 
preserve of national politics and political decision making. " (152) In 1649 Leveller 
women, in the face of much hostility and ridicule, demonstrated at the door of the 
House of Commons for the liberation of John Lilburne. Yet there is no evidence that 
these radical women, who asserted that they too were made in the image of Christ, 
ever demanded the vote. Like everyone else, they accepted the patriarchal assumption 
that they were represented by their husbands. As Manning wryly observes, "It is 
odd .. . to have expected the Levellers and Diggers to have advocated votes for women 
when two centuries later the Chartists still did not do so." (165) 
The most important chapter of the book is the last, entitled" Soldiers, levellers and 
revolution." Besides an exhaustive treatment of the pamphlet and newsbook literature 
of the time, the author engages with the writings of contemporary scholars, notably 
Barbara Taft, Austin Woolrych, Murray Tolmie, John Morrill and the present writer. 
Manning finds wanting the argument of Taft and myself that the Officers' version of 
the Agreement of the People got nowhere in the House of Commons because it had 
been imposed on the senior officers by the junior officers. He believes that its failure 
had more to do with the army's essentially undemocratic view of itself as a godly 
elite, an instrument in the hands of the almighty. This was a different outlook from 
that of the Levellers; hence Manning accuses me of making a misleading assertion 
when I state that both officers and Levellers would have established something like 
a "dictatorship of the godly." My argument was that by excluding from the franchise 
all those who had opposed the revolution, or who refused to sign the Agreement, the 
Levellers were in effect greatly narrowing the definition of "the p e ~ p l e . " ~  Manning 
retorts that "however broadly or narrowly the Levellers defined 'the people,' they did 
4 The New Model Army, 292-3 
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not make 'godliness' a qualification for exercising the franchise or holding of- 
fice." (176) This is a fair point. 
Elsewhere however, Manning is less persuasive. In his chapter on the poor he tells 
us that in their joint opposition to free quarter, the interests of the army coincided 
with those of the people. This masked a much more fundamental discord between the 
two, for by 1646 the people were heartily sick of taxation that was heavier than 
anything the king had ever imposed. Yet the excise and the monthly assessment, so 
vociferously denounced by the Levellers, were the army's lifeblood, and the only 
guarantee against a royalist revival. To his credit, Manning recognizes this fundamen- 
tal disharmony between the Levellers and the army in this last chapter. At the same 
time however, he is loth to accept my finding that only a minority of the men in three 
(not four as Manning alleges) of the troops of Ireton's regiment joined the Leveller- 
inspired mutiny at Burford. This finding is based on a careful review of all the printed 
and manuscript sources,5 but Manning provides no references to support his statement 
that "the evidence does not support the assertion of Gentles." (203,267 n., 87) This 
disagreement points to a persistent methodological problem in Manning's work: his 
nearly exclusive reliance on printed tracts and newsbooks, and his refusal to consult 
unpublished archival sources. In an earlier review John Momll made the valid point 
that much of the printed material produced by the revolution was mere propaganda, 
and therefore has to be handled with the greatest care.6 
Concerning the mutinous regiments that were crushed at Burford in May 1649, 
Manning comments that it would be misleading to call it a "Leveller revolt."(208) 
After all the mutineers did not mention the recently published Agreement of the 
People in their printed declarations, nor the Leveller leaders who were at that moment 
languishing in prison. On the other hand their demand for the reinstatement of the 
General Council of the Army was one which the Levellers had been making since 
March. Significant too is the fact that printed and manuscript sources at the time refer 
repeatedly to "the Leveller rising."' Moreover, the crushing of the mutiny was hailed 
as adefeat for the Levellers, as Manning himself acknowledges. In any case, Manning 
and I are in agreement that the mutinies at Burford, Banbury and Wellingborough in 
the spring of 1649 were a watershed, marking the triumph of military force over the 
more radical and populist wing of the revolution. 
Both books are unfortunately marred by a structural defect: each lacks a conclu- 
sion. Instead of tying together the themes and arguments presented in the previous 
chapters, the books either simply trail off with a mocking quotation from Richard 
Overton in the case of 1649, or end abruptly with the failure of the Levellers in the 
case of The English People. 
To tie together the themes of this review, Manning's unabashed reassertion of the 
reality of class conflict as the engine behind the English Revolution will win the assent 
5 Ibid., 334, nn. 89-92. 
6 "Provincial squires and 'middling sorts' in the Great Rebellion," Historical Journal, 20 (1977), 230. 
7 The New Model A m y ,  536, n. 120. 
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of few experts in the field. On the other hand, his wide reading in the printed sources, 
and his courteous manner of debating those with whom he disagrees, command our 
admiration. There is much stimulation, and much to ponder on in both books. 
